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"It is the viewpoint that creates the object." (de Saussure, 1966, p. 8) 
Israeli archaeologist Gabriel Barkay has recently published a pre-
liminary report and reading of Hebrew inscriptions incised on two thin 
silver strips (Barkay, 1986, esp. pp. 29-31). Each has been identified as a 
version of the so-called priestly benediction that appears in the Masoretic 
Text in Num 6:24-26. The larger text is said to contain traces of the 
three benedictions that we read in the MT. Contrary to what an inno-
cent reader might suppose from any of a number of newspaper accounts 
of the discovery and deciphering of the texts, the paleographer, Ada 
Yardeni, did not identify the famous passage by simply reading the 
ancient Hebrew characters. She had, at first, considerable difficulty in 
distinguishing the Hebrew letters from other scratches in the silver. 
She could, however, make out three instances of the tetragrammaton, 
YHWH. She proceeded to identify, decipher, and read additional letters 
and words only after a friend had suggested that, in view of the three 
occurrences of YHWH, the text might correspond to the threefold 
priestly benediction (Rabinovich, 1986, p. 12). The delicately engraved 
• An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the World Congress of Jewish 
Studies, Jerusalem, 1985, and printed as "The Role of Theory in Biblical Criticism" in 
Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem, 1986), Division A, 
pp. 167-74. Thanks to the World Union of Jewish Studies to incorporate that essay into 
the present one. Thanks, too, to the Abbell Research Fund of the Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America for supporting part of the preparation of this essay. Although I have 
changed my position very little, I have been stimulated to rethink aspects of my original 
presentation through discussions and! or correspondence with Adele Berlin, Aaron Demsky, 
Yehoshua Gitay. Avi Hurvitz, Sarah Japhet, Jacob Milgrom, Yochanan Muffs, Michael 
O'Connor, Uriel Simon, and Jeremiah Unterman. I am also indebted to conversations 
with Stanley Fish prior to composing the first version of the essay. Only l am responsible 
for what I have written. 
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letters were found to be meaningful only after the paleographer had a 
prior hypothesis about what the text might contain. Even more to the 
point: once Yardeni had read three benedictions on the larger silver 
strip, she realized that one of the instances of YHWH that she had 
earlier noticed was not part of the three benedictions at all. It belonged 
to another part of the text. In other words, based on partially incorrect 
data, she tested a hypothesis that proved correct and, as a result, proved 
that some of the initial data was wrong. What should be clear from this 
particular account is that, as philosophers of science and others have 
long maintained, all observation, be it scientific or of the everyday 
variety, begins with a theory (cf. Pepper, 1948; Polanyi, 1969; Kuhn, 
1970; Fcyerabend, 1978; Popper, 1979; Fish, 1980). 1 Our very observa-
tions, and not only our interpretations, are necessarily shaped by what-
ever presuppositions, hypotheses, and bodies of knowledge we possess. 
Our theories guide our selection of evidence, and even our construction 
of evidence. 
ln the case of Yardeni 's reading of the silver engraving, the paleog-
rapher brought, we must imagine, a large number of theories or theo-
retical frameworks, within which she examined the inscription. She no 
doubt made assumptions about how to position the text for reading; 
about what script the text was written in; about the language of the 
writing; and, most strikingly, about what the letters might mean. We 
make assumptions in our work routinely, so much so that we tend to 
take them for granted. Let us consider a simple illustration. 
No one, so far as I know, doubts that a number of chapters of biblical 
verse conform to the pattern of an alphabetic acrostic (e.g., Pss 34, I 11, 
112, 119, 145; Prov 31:10 31; Lam 1-4; and with varying degrees of 
irregularity Ps 9-10, 25, 37). Each line or couplet begins with a succeed-
ing letter of the alphabet. Everyone, I suppose, will agree that the 
alphabetic acrostic was a convention of ancient Israelite verse. That 
conclusion, with which I concur, rests upon a number of assumptions 
that can be posited axiomatically but cannot be proved or deduced from 
unassumed premises. To begin, one discovers the acrostic in the first 
I. Although these and other discussants of theory disagree on many issues, such as the 
role of evidence in supporting a theory and the necessity of conducting tests for possible 
falsification of a theory, they agree on this. For summary discussion, see Barbour (1974). 
Barbour pays proper attention to types of models (esp. pp. 29-33) and to criteria for 
evaluating competing models or theories (esp. pp. 112-18), but while these are two issues 
that deserve special attention in a wider discussion of the role of theory in biblical 
criticism, I confine myself to arguing the more limited, prior claim that biblical studies 
unavoidably draws on nondemonstrable presuppositions and beliefs, even at the stage of 
defining the evidence. On this point, cf. Barbour's summary discussion on pp. 94-98. 
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place only after one already has a prior concept of what an acrostic is. 
We match our concept of the acrostic with the pattern that we find in 
the biblical text. But in order to find that pattern one must first apply 
some theory for defining the lines of verse and divide the text into lines. 
One must then decide that the initial letter of every line or every other 
line belongs not to a random pattern but to a meaningful design. In the 
case of the alphabetic acrostic, the meaningful design is the Hebrew 
alphabet. Without knowing what an acrostic is, one could not discover 
the alphabet in the pattern; and without knowing the Hebrew alphabet 
one could not have found the acrostic pattern in the text. The two 
identifications are twin components of a single construct. 
To claim that the alphabetic acrostic was a convention of Israelite 
verse demands that we make additional assumptions: that the ancient 
bard intended to pattern his lines according to an alphabetic acrostic, 
and, further, that the Israelites had an alphabet. Since we are not 
"empirical" observers of the biblical world and its historical setting, even 
the existence of an ancient Hebrew alphabet rests on theory. 2 To prove 
that the Hebrews had an alphabet we cannot use the very acrostics we 
are discussing to document the existence of the alphabet. This would be 
arguing in an obvious circle. One can, of course, adduce the clzbet Sarta 
inscription, part of which more or less corresponds to our idea of the 
Hebrew alphabet; and one can go farther afield and identify cognate 
alphabets in Ugaritic and ancient Aramaic and Ammonite epigraphs (see 
Demsky, 1977 and Lemaire, 1985, p. 39). But without a prior notion of 
what an alphabet looks like one could not have found alphabets in these 
extra-biblical texts either. To use our identification of the alphabet in 
one place to prove its existence in another is merely, borrowing a phrase 
from Nabokov's Lolita "like a conjurer explaining one trick by perform-
ing another." 
Rather, in identifying the alphabet in extra-biblical texts and in dis-
covering alphabetic acrostics in the Bible we follow a certain set of 
assumptions or beliefs~our theory of the alphabet and its use. The 
theory entails the assumptions that an ancient Israelite verse-maker and 
his audience knew the alphabet and that the use of the alphabet in an 
acrostic was a convention of ancient Hebrew verse. On the basis of this 
set of premises, we make deductions concerning the structure of various 
biblical psalms and elegies. 
2. As I shall claim below, even had we lived in biblical times, our observations would 
remain hypothetical. The term "empirical" is used to deny the necessary "subjective" 
features of all observation. 
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My intention is not to cast doubt on the reality of alphabetic acrostics 
in the Bible. It is rather to avow that whenever we make literary or any 
other kind of observations on the Bible, or on any other texts, we have 
no choice but to use the models with which we are familiar to identify 
and classify that which we observe (cf., e.g., Kugel, 1981, p. 302; 
Magonet, 1986, p. 91). We find parallelism, chiasm, meter, even meta-
phor in biblical verse only after we have a theory of what those literary 
forms are. The theory adopts or develops methods for identifying those 
forms. 
One cannot simply "infer," as Alter suggests (1983, p. 118), the con-
ventions of the literature "by a careful inspection of the texts. " 3 Alter 
himself has implicitly acknowledged this point elsewhere (1985, pp. 205-
6), where he admits that a "scholar from another planet" without any 
training in Elizabethan poetry would fail to discover the most evident 
patterns in Shakespeare's sonnets. One cannot in unmediated fashion 
"elicit ... the innate conventions and literary formations of a piece of 
ancient literature" (Greenberg, 1983, p. 21). It is impossible, as Fish 
( 1980) and Mitchell ( 1985) and others have contended at length, to "curb 
all temptations to impose [our] antecedent judgments on the text" 
(Greenberg, 1983, p. 21). The process of perception, even in psycho-
physics (e.g., Hochberg, 1978, p. 88), is not merely one of receiving and 
storing stimuli. It is always an interpretive process, an active, though 
largely automatic, implementafrm of our prior models, presuppositions, 
and analytic strategies. It is use: 1! to become aware of our assumptions 
so that we may subject them to criticism and reconsider our reliance on 
them (cf. Greenstein, 1985). But even when we do not notice them, they 
are there. 
The most exact science begins with deductions from hypothetical 
foundations. Consider this description by Albert Einstein ( 1950, p. 96): 
Physics constitutes a logical system of thought which is in a state of 
evolution, and whose basis cannot be obtained through distillation by any 
inductive method from the experiences lived through, but which can only 
be attained by free invention. 
As Einstein had already characterized the project of physics in 1918 (in 
Pirsig, 1975, p. 99): "The supreme task ... is to arrive at those elemen-
tary laws from which the cosmos can be built up by pure deduction." 
The root of the laws lies in the model in the thinker's imagination: 
3. Cf. Geller's critique (1984) of Alter's notion that texts speak for themselves. 
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Man tries to make for himself in the fashion that suits him best a 
simplified and intelligible picture of the world. He then tries to some 
extent to substitute this cosmos of his for the world of experience, and 
thus to overcome it. 4 
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What has been acknowledged for physics applies as well to the social 
sciences and humanities (cf. Scholes and Kellogg, 1966, pp. 276, 278; 
Chomsky, 1972; Culler, 1975) and has been recognized by some for the 
specific field of biblical studies (cf., e.g., Polzin, 1977; Gibson, 1981; 
Barton, 1984). 
The best known instance of applying a model in biblical studies 
involves source criticism in general and the Documentary Hypothesis in 
particular. Tsevat (l 975) has challenged biblical critics to state their 
underlying assumptions, their "first principles," and subject them to 
models that are familiar to us from other sources. Tigay ( 1975, 1982, 
1985; cf. Kaufman, 1982) has suggested that his own and others' source 
critical analyses of other ancient Near Eastern texts might serve as an 
appropriate model for reconstructing the composition of the Torah. 5 
This is a perfectly valid proposal. What is mistaken is the concomitant 
claim that such analyses are somehow "empirical." An empirical obser-
vation claims to examine directly the actual historical composition of 
the texts in question. On this Steiner (1975, p. 137) has stated the 
counterclaim succinctly: "To all past events, as to all present intake, the 
observer brings a specific mental set." The so-called "empirical" observa-
tion of concrete "evidence" is mediated by theory just as all observation 
is. What Tigay and others6 produce are theories concerning the his-
torical relationships of ancient Near Eastern texts. They, too, are in-
formed by a number of presupposed principles. For example, Tigay 
4. Husserl (1962), too, has contended that physics applies its own principles of logic in 
order to create a "hypothetical substructure" of "thing-realities" (p. 147). 
5. Tigay's model of composition of the Gilgamesh Epic actually resembles the model of 
Van Seters (see below) more than the classical Documentary Hypothesis; cf. Rainey 
( 1978). 
6. In addition to the contributors to Tigay (1985), cf. also Berlin (1983, esp. pp. 129ff.). 
Somewhat analogously, Fish bane ( 1985) seeks to distinguish different types of ancient 
scribal explication of the biblical text on the basis of whether "formulaic indicators" of 
such explication are evident. Such indicators, says Fish bane (p. 56), "permit a relatively 
objective identification of the scribal comments involved." However, Fish bane seems to 
overlook that it is only through his own, or someone else's, exegesis that certain words or 
phrases in the Hebrew are taken to be "formulaic indicators" of"scribal comments." There 
is nothing even "relatively objective" about such exegesis. Although Fishbane may himself 
feel more sanguine about his determination of explicit scribal annotations than about his 
82 EDWARD L. GREENSTEIN 
assumes that documents that are found to have affinities to earlier 
documents are related through some history of written composition. His 
evidence for relations in writing can also be explained by assuming that 
the written texts reflect different orally performed versions of the text at 
hand (see, e.g., Tigay, 1982, pp. 58-59, 61ff., 82ff., and passim). Tigay 
dismisses this alternative by asserting that he distrusts the hypothesis of 
oral prototypes (1982, pp. 102-3). Tigay may be correct, but we can 
never know that because, by definition, oral performances, until recently, 
have gone unrecorded. One may not make a virtue out of a necessity 
and bar unattested and unattestable material from our hypotheses. In 
more extreme fashion Van Seters virtually disqualifies all "prior ver-
sions" of a biblical text from a hypothesis concerning the historical 
development of that text ( 1975, pp. 155-56). Precisely because no one 
has direct access to the history of ancient literature, one will always 
remain in the position of imagining, or hypothesizing, the history of the 
text. 
This, in fact, is always the case with history. The history is not in the 
data but in the analysis. It is worth repeating here the well-known 
remarks of Carr (1961, p. 10): "The belief in a hard core of historical 
facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the 
historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to 
eradicate" (cf. Kurzweil, 1970, part 2). The role of a theoretical model 
behind the historian writing the story of ancient Israelite history has 
been cleverly illustrated by Sasson (1981) in his contrast of the American 
and German schools of modern biblical historiography. He argues, in a 
manner that is highly suggestive if not altogether convincing to me, that 
scholars have imagined~-and reconstructed--the origins of the Israelite 
tribal union according to the way in which their own nations con-
federated. America was colonized by waves of immigrants who even-
tually formed a union of states, and so have W. F. Albright and John 
Bright, and others, conceived of the formation of ancient Israel. Germany 
was unified only through the later confederation of a number of origi-
nally autonomous local states-a model that has been translated by 
A Alt and M. Noth to the early history of Israel. Indeed, the academic 
controversy concerning the emergence of Israel has turned more and 
more explicitly into a discussion of competing models (for a summary of 
determination of implicit ones, both kinds of determinations are products of his own 
analysis. Indeed, without going into details here, I find some of his identifications of 
"unmarked" explications more convincing than some of his identifications of "formu-
laically indicated" ones. 
THEORY AND ARGUMENT IN BIBLICAL CRITICISM 83 
the models, see Gottwald, 1985, pp. 261-88). Rendtorff ( 1986, p. 22) 
puts it this way: 
Each of the models is based on particular presuppositions which often 
seem more important in the discussion than the reconstruction itself, since 
they involve methodological, historical, and theological questions of prin-
ciple, all at the same time. 
It would therefore seem useful in academic discourse among scholars 
taking divergent theoretical stances to acknowledge the differences in 
first principles or beliefs that divide us before proceeding to examine the 
argumentation or logic of the other's positions. Greenberg (1983, p. 20) 
points out the axiomatic first steps of scholarship when he speaks of the 
"a prioris, an array of unproved (and unprovable) modern assumptions 
and conventions that confirm themselves through the results obtained by 
forcing them on the text. ... " Greenberg has in mind those biblicists 
who assume that the earlier and more original the material is, the 
simpler and more thematically uniform it is. By isolating small passages 
that display simplicity and inner coherence, such scholars believe that 
they are identifying the historically earlier units of a given text. Green-
berg, however, refers to the assumptions of these critics as "prejudices," 
as though one could choose to be neutral and unprejudiced. But, as 
Rorty (1982, 1984) and others (notably Fish) have demonstrated, we all 
begin with beliefs or assumptions that guide us in our observations and 
analyses. Greenberg reveals his own premises in the following pages 
(1983, pp. 25-26): that the text at hand is to be taken as a whole; that 
one should "look ... for design and for integrating elements" in order to 
find patterns; and that discontinuities in the text constitute variations on 
the pattern rather than indications of disparate sources. This set of 
assumptions belongs to a coherent theory. It is not an argument of 
theory versus no theory, or subjectivity versus neutrality. It is an argu-
ment between a theory of multiple composition and a theory of single or 
homogeneous composition. 7 
One finds an analogous opposition of initial premises in the area of 
textual criticism (see further T ov, 1984 / 85). The position that regards 
textual emendation with suspicion has been clearly articulated by Gordis 
(1982, p. 198): "the given text is a datum and the emended, deleted or 
transposed text is a hypothesis." In fact the restructured text is hypo-
thetical. The acceptance of the received text, based on whatever beliefs, 
7. Cf. Barrick (1986), who. in his review of Greenberg (1983), observes that "Greenberg 
operates in an entirely different mode., from typical historical critics. 
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is also hypothetical, though. One cannot know that the received text is 
more original, or "better" in any other way. Gordis employs the meta-
phor of the text as a body in need of medical repair (cf. his title: 
"Traumatic Surgery in Biblical Scholarship"). Surgery might be a last 
resort if the body could be mended by less "traumatic" means. But if a 
scholar judges that a text is dismembered, only surgery can bind the 
parts together into an organic whole. It is the initial assumption or 
hypothesis of the physician, as it is of the philologist, to decide whether 
one should work with the corpus as it stands or to rebuild the corpus 
into a unity. 
Returning to the higher criticism of the Torah, the debate over the 
composition of the Pentateuch often represents itself as an argument 
about logic, methodology, and data. As I see it, however, the contest is 
often between theories or models of composition. Each theory, as 
Rendtorff has explained (1984, esp. p. 11), applies the methods of 
analysis or exegesis that serve its ends. As Carr has written of profes-
sional historians, "By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts 
he wants" ( 1961, p. 26). The analyst ascertains what facts are significant 
and in what manner to arrange them. This is not meant to disparage 
historiography; it is meant to describe the only way, under the best of 
circumstances, that any scientific, as well as humanistic, inquiry can 
operate. If the source critic assumes that every shift in style or topic 
conveys special significance, one will never discover diverse sources in 
the Torah. Applying the tools of source critical analysis, one will per-
force disintegrate the text. Because the very tools that a critic uses will 
perform the task that the critic envisions at the outset, one cannot 
legitimately use the methods and conclusions of one theory in criticizing 
another. Each theory's methods select and interpret evidence in order to 
support or lend substance to the arguments that hold up the theory. One 
may prefer a house of bricks to a house of wood. But one should not 
fault the mason for using bricks and mortar instead of boards and nails. 
When, for example, Segal attacked the Documentary Hypothesis, he 
was correct in describing the regnant source theory of his day as follows 
(1967, p. 2): 
The principal assertions of the [Documentary Theory's] system, originally 
nothing more than pure suppositions, have now matured with age and 
with constant repetition into axiomatic truths, which control the thinking 
of scholars and direct their approach to biblical problems. 
His remarks have been recently echoed by Rendtorff ( 1984, p. 2): 
The documentary hypothesis was a dogma and every scholar who wanted 
to be accepted by the establishment of Old Testament scholarship had to 
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submit to this theory in order to demonstrate that he was able to handle 
the established method. 
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What they describe happens in the growth of any discipline or science. 
Once a number of workers in the field become convinced of a hypothesis 
or model, they accept it as an axiom and proceed from there (see, e.g., 
Kuhn, 1970 and Feyerabend, 1978). They make deductions from their 
shared axioms. Segal opposed the Documentary Hypothesis and its 
source analytical procedures because they conflicted with his own model 
of a singly authored text with occasional supplements. Accordingly, he 
criticized source criticism for its method of "wrench[ing] ... passage[ s] 
out of [their J context[ s] ... and interpret[ing them J as independent of 
what precedes ... and what follows .... " (Segal, 1967, p. 5). 
Applying the tools of his own model of unitary composition, Segal 
performed often idiosyncratic exegesis so that the theory he espoused 
would seem impregnable. He interpreted Exod 3: 13, mii semo, for ex-
ample, to mean not "What is his name?" but rather "What meaneth his 
name? What is its import and its significance?" (loc. cit.). In Segal's 
view, of course, the Hebrews would already have known the tetra-
grammaton, as it was used throughout Genesis. The common enough 
Hebrew phrase must, according to his approach, have a sense that 
differs from its ordinary one. His theory affects, or colors, his reading of 
Exodus. Because for Segal the Torah is "a continuous whole," the 
interpreter should "seek out the Theme which guides its successive 
events and the aim to which they are leading" (p. 22). He claimed that 
this approach to the text was the one the text itself called for because the 
text as we now have it is, and has been preserved as, a single piece. This 
circular argument cannot be accepted by anyone who would conceive of 
a model of composition other than that of single authorship. The 
reasoning of Segal resembles that of those, cited above, who discount 
the hypothesis of written sources or oral traditions because they do not 
exist (now). If one believes in a theory of composition that involves the 
positing of oral sources, one's beliefs cannot be shaken by pointing out 
that those sources do not exist anymore. An archaeologist does not 
confine himself to existing potsherds in diagramming an ancient jug. 
One imagines that a hypothetical jug possessed the missing pieces, the 
ones that may have been lost forever, in making one's reconstruction. 
The literary historian, as another hypothesis builder, must imagine the 
complete model of a text consisting of all the pieces that one believes 
once existed. 
While many scholars are aware that we have conflicting models of the 
Torah's composition among us, few of us, in our public discussion of 
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rival theories, act on that awareness. In order to illustrate my claim, and 
distinguish between differences in belief or model and differences in logic 
or argumentation, I shall draw on my reading of twelve professional 
reviews-many of them lengthy-of Van Seters' book, Abraham in 
History and Tradition, published in 1975. Van Seters challenged the 
Graf-Wellhausen Documentary Hypothesis as it was developed by Noth. 
According to that theory, as summarized, for example, in Freedman 
(1962), the written sources J and E adapted a common tradition, G, that 
was either oral or written. J and E were redacted into a single edition. 
Van Seters, on the other hand, following the lead of his teacher Winnett 
(1965) and anticipated by such nineteenth century scholars as Ewald (see 
de Pury, 1978, p. 604 with n. 39), described a different theory. Before 
proceeding to delineate that theory it will be useful to consider the 
reasons that Winnett and Van Seters sought an alternative to the modi-
fied Documentary Hypothesis. Few of Van Seters' reviewers considered 
this. 
First, the scholarly consensus on the Graf-Wellhausen theory had 
been deteriorating persistently for decades. Second, Winnett and Van 
Seters felt that source analytical procedures fragmented what looked to 
them like "unified stories and episodes" (Van Seters, 1975, p. 127; cf. 
Winnett, 1965, pp. 6, IO). Third, the E source is notoriously difficult to 
document except in the so-called "doublets," stories that are told twice 
or more. Fourth, Winnett and Van Seters recognized that the hypothesis 
of a common source for J and E, a Grund/age, and the assumption of a 
series of redactors were necessitated only by dint of the prior hypothesis 
of discrete written sources, J and E (Van Seters, 1975, pp. 125-29). 
A fifth, and so far as I know unstated reason for the alternate theory, 
is simply that Winnett and Van Seters imagined a different possibility 
for explaining the Torah's composition. It is true that new theories are 
often advanced in response to a crisis: the old theory would not solve a 
nagging problem. It is also true, however, that new theories have fre-
quently been introduced when most scholars were content with the old 
ones (cf., e.g., Kuhn, 1970). New theories need not emerge over the 
rubble of a shattered older theory. To insist that they do is to commit 
what Pepper (1948, p. 100) has called "the fallacy of clearing the 
ground." Nor need a new theory explain the presently known evidence 
better than the older theory. New theories will define new issues and 
may restructure the current data into different evidence altogether. 
Because, as I have argued above, theory informs observation, too, new 
theories will yield new evidence (cf. especially Feyerabend, 1978). 
Van Seters' work interests us because he in fact shares most of the 
assumptions and methods of other historical critics (cf. Thompson, 
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1978, p. 77). He marshals them toward a different conclusion, however. 
In our discussion of his work we shall focus not on his dating of the 
patriarchal narratives but on his, and Winnett's, model of how the 
Pentateuch was composed. Briefly put, this model views the text's com-
position not as a redaction of parallel documents but as an agglomera-
tion of successive revisions. It sees a series of writers taking older 
documents and composing new material to supplement and rewrite 
those documents. Certain explicit presuppositions guide Van Seters' 
work. First, as I have noted above, is his disbelief in a background of 
oral traditions behind the written text (see now also Van Seters, 1983). 
Put positively, he places a premium on the written evidence at hand. 
Second, he asserts that the same writer would not write the same story 
twice. This, it should be remarked, is consistent with his first premise, as 
we ordinarily associate different versions of the same story with oral 
narration. Third, only gross discontinuities in the text betray signs of 
diverse sources (Van Seters, 1975, pp. 154-56). Now let us review what 
the critics have done with Van Seters. 
In general, critics admired his work, even when dissenting from his 
conclusions. A number either neglected or paid little attention to his 
literary analysis (e.g., Clements, 1977; Rainey, 1978; Sarna, 1977), which 
is clearly the more significant, as well as the larger, part of his book (so 
Van Seters, 1978, p. 6). Some opposed Van Seters' theory because it 
rejected the oral background of the narratives that so many came to 
believe (e.g., McEvenue, 1977; Nicholson, 1979; de Pury, 1978; Sarna, 
1977; van Selms, 1977). In and of itself, this is legitimate. But it is no 
criticism. The absence of oral tradition fits in perfectly with Van Seters' 
model, in which, for the most part, writers rewrite writers. 8 Thompson 
( 1978, p. 80), in what is otherwise the most sophisticated discussion of 
Van Seters, faults him for his "methodological tendentiousness." Every 
method is, in a sense, tendentious, though, as it drives toward a specific, 
foreseen goal. The type of argument and rhetoric that one uses in the 
service of a theory, as well as the evidence one adduces in support of the 
argument, would never have been exercised had they not sustained the 
theory. That is why, as Fish ( 1980, p. 68) says, "theories always work 
and they will always produce exactly the results they predict," and that 
is what Stein (1982, p. 80) explains by writing "A bed is always com-
fortable if it is made so." 
8. Van Seters (1983, pp. 18ff., 226-227.), however. criticizes the argument for an early 
oral epic behind the Pentateuchal narrative without ever answering the arguments adduced 
from verse fragments, taken to be excerpts from an earlier epic, within the present text. 
Aside from Cross (1973), see especially Cassuto (1975; first published in Hebrew in 1943). 
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Some reviewers (e.g., Cazelles, 1978; McEvenue, 1977; de Pury, 1978) 
attacked Van Seters' literary analysis by applying different methods to 
his texts and by showing that the different methods yield results in line 
with an alternate theory. That is, however, as it must be. One cannot 
prove anything by criticizing one theory with the tools of another one, 
as I have said above; recall the analogy of the mason and the carpenter. 
Van Selms ( 1977), for example, agreed with Van Seters that the author 
of Genesis 21 knew the text of Genesis 16. In Van Seters' theory that is 
because the author of chapter 21 was rewriting chapter 16; in the 
reviewer's theory that is because the same author wrote both. Others, 
assuming the independence of an E source (e.g., McEvenue, 1977; cf. 
idem 1984) and the work of a redactor, performed variant interpre-
tations of Van Seters' texts with the methods of the Documentary 
Hypothesis. Van Seters was well aware of source critical alternatives 
before he began. 
Gen 21:8, for example, refers not to Isaac but to hayyeled, "the boy." 
Since "the boy" presupposes Isaac, Van Seters ( 1975, p. 196) contends 
that this verse must be an integral part of the preceding passage. A 
source critic could argue, in opposition, that when the passage contain-
ing verse 8 was joined to the preceding one, the redactor replaced "Isaac" 
with "the boy." Similarly, Hagar's expectation of inheritance rights in 
chapter 21 presupposes the situation at the beginning of chapter 16. For 
Van Seters (1975, p. 197), this proves that the author of chapter 21 
depended on a preexisting chapter 16. But one could counter that 
chapter 21 once contained similar information which was omitted in the 
process of redaction as an unnecessary duplication. All I am saying is 
that proponents of different theories will perform different analyses. One 
cannot further discussion by criticizing a theory through the conceptual 
framework and methods of another theory. 
Nicholson ( 1979, p. 231) has challenged Van Seters' model by asking 
why an author would write a different story in order to revise one he did 
not like. Why not simply replace the earlier story with a new one? One 
could ask the same thing of the hypothetical redactor. But raising the 
question-rather than imagining an answer-reflects the failure to realize 
that one is judging Van Seters by one's own methods. Winnett had a 
decade earlier provided an answer: the author customarily added new 
material to old while conserving the old. One may not believe that this is 
what happened; but it is perfectly plausible that it did. At bottom, 
debates over compositional history, as over all our other concerns, boil 
down to conflicts of presuppositions, first principles, beliefs. 
Finally, some reviewers (e.g., Cazelles, 1978; Pardee, 1979; Roberts, 
1977) dismissed Van Seters' reconstruction because it took account of 
THEORY AND ARGUMENT IN BIBLICAL CRITICISM 89 
Genesis alone, and only part of Genesis at that. They implied that such a 
theory might not be able to explain the composition of the entire Torah, 
or of at least the Tetrateuch. Again, such critics did not look beyond the 
Documentary Hypothesis to entertain the possibilities of another theory. 
The Documentary Theory begins with the assumption of large parallel 
sources, overlapping in their coverage of a long stretch of Israelite 
tradition. Adherents of this theory would naturally consider it essential 
to examine the whole before drawing any conclusions. But Van Seters' 
theory assumes a stratified model, adding layer to layer. It makes sense 
within this model to begin with a limited block of material, and the 
research of Rendtorff (1977, 1984) on later parts of the Torah can be 
invoked in support of the promise of Van Seters' theory. Source critics 
should remember, too, that the Documentary Hypothesis also started 
small. 
We can further appreciate the role that our presuppositions play in 
our argumentation and rhetoric by examining, or deconstructing, the 
language that we use in our criticism. To take one example from the 
Van Seters literature, at least four reviewers contended with Van Seters 
by asserting that the evidence actually "points" in a different direction 
(Clements, 1977, p. 91; Rainey, 1978, p. 132; Roberts, 1977, p. 109; 
Sarna, 1977, p. 9). Van Seters has himself used this expression in his 
reply to criticism (1978, pp. 6-7). Using language that places the truth in 
the power of the evidence gives the impression that it is not we who rely 
on our own force of logic or persuasion but that some external, "objec-
tive" standard articulates the truth for us. "Pointing" evidence, of course, 
is actually a metaphor, a personification of the data that we have found, 
structured, and adduced. We interpret the evidence, and we point it. By 
acknowledging our role behind the evidence we become more aware of 
our principles and models, and of those of the other person. 
To conclude, I return to the silver inscriptions with which we began. 
According to all reports, the larger text contains three benedictions, 
similar to those in Num 6:24-26. The shorter one presents two benedic-
tions. The second one seems to contain the first half of the second 
blessing in the MT and the second half of the third. Barkay ( 1986, 
p. 30) reads it as follows: y)r yh[wh] pnyw [~l]yk w[ys]m lk s[l]wm 
"May YHWH shine his face toward you, and may he grant you peace." 
ls this benediction a literary (intentional) conflation of the latter two 
blessings in the longer version'! Barkay (p. 30) seems to think so, as he 
compares the benediction in Ps 67:2, which resembles parts of the first 
two blessings in Numbers 6. It is also possible that the scribe skipped 
from the first half of the second blessing to the second half of the third, 
as the first half of each ends with the same phrase, pnyw "lyk "his face 
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toward you." It would then be a case of homoioteleuton, one of the 
commonest of copyist errors. Which is more likely? There is no method 
that can dictate an answer. The method or approach (explain the text as 
it stands, or restore the text to its perfect form) depends upon our view 
of the inscription and how we imagine the scribe wrote it. Was he 
careless? Was he cramped by the short space? Was he underpaid? Was 
he interested in conveying a shorter text? Was he trying to be creative? 
We cannot know. We will take a stand, if we choose to do so, in 
accordance with other assumptions that we have made, or theories that 
we hold dear. Whether we see a whole text or a defective one involves a 
range of beliefs. To engage in our work as Biblicists means we must 
exercise our beliefs. 
Does this mean that we cannot appeal to a standard, to a higher 
authority? Within the academic community, or any other, we share 
common assumptions with other people, conventions that enable us to 
communicate with each other (see Fish 1980).9 When the community to 
which we belong, or choose to belong, accepts a set of assumptions as 
"facts," we then take them for granted and build our arguments upon 
them (cf. Pepper 1948). In Biblical studies, we have been passing through 
a period in which many of the old "facts" have been challenged. One 
therefore may facilitate discussion and understanding by laying bare our 
assumptions and sorting out those of the arguments we criticize. We 
might then find that our arguments over method are fundamentally 
differences in assumptions or beliefs. 
9. Fish's concept of interpretive communities has been widely criticized (see some of the 
essays in Mitchell, l 985, for example) and misinterpreted. Scholes ( 1984), pp. 129 65, 
misses Fish's point that it is a community-whichever community (since language and 
semiotic codes in general are never strictly solipsistic)-that creates the code for interpret-
ing even so apparently factual a datum as a punctuation mark. Most critics misread Fish 
by failing to realize that he is describing how he thinks we read or interpret evidence rather 
than prescribing how we ought to do so. Further, when Fish asserts that we write what we 
read he means that the reader must take full responsibility for one's readings, which are 
not the unmediated product of what the text says but of what one makes of the text. In 
representing my sympathy with Fish's views I do not indicate here the more radical aspects 
of his position. I confine myself to the major themes of the essay: that theory precedes 
observation and that so much controversy in biblical studies boils down to differences over 
competing theories or fundamental beliefs. It is worth noting, too, that I would formulate 
much of my own writing on Bible differently were I to start over according to my current 
thinking. In general I nowadays speak more carefully of what I read than of what the text 
"says." Nevertheless, there is no harm in personifying, and of objectifying, "the text" so 
long as one is aware and makes others aware of what one is doing. 
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